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INTRODUCTION
Eleven days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
1
Act (ATSSSA). Title IV of the Act created the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001 (the “Fund”), an administrative compen2
sation scheme for those victimized by the attacks. The Act presents
the purpose of the Fund with great simplicity: “It is the purpose of
this title to provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a
deceased individual) who was physically injured or killed as a result of
3
the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.” This
Comment questions the effectiveness of the legislation in achieving its
stated purpose, examines the source of its failure, and offers a proposal to remedy the situation.
The Fund’s failures stem from restrictive eligibility guidelines and
unconstitutional limitations imposed on those deemed ineligible for
the Fund. The definition of eligible individuals in the rules promulgated to administer the Fund limited the pool of people eligible for
compensation to those who died or sustained physical injury during or
immediately following the planes crashing into the World Trade Cen-
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Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. 107-42, 115 Stat.
230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §40101 (Supp. I 2001)).
2
Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001).
3
Id. § 403, 115 Stat. 230, 237.
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ter (“WTC” or “towers”) and the towers collapsing. Additionally,
driven by the broader purpose of the ATSSSA—protecting the airlines
5
involved in the 9/11 attacks— Congress capped the liability of the air6
lines at the limits of their insurance coverage. This cap limited the
airlines’ liability to approximately six billion dollars, a pool from
7
which all parties not eligible for the Fund must seek compensation.
In contrast, the legislation placed no cap on the amount eligible
8
claimants could recover from the Fund.
In combination, the restrictive definition of eligible individuals
and the airlines’ limited liability created a class of victims, those injured by the 9/11 attacks but ineligible for the Fund, whose recov9
ery—if any—will be limited to the airlines’ insurance coverage. This
class notably includes the estimated 300,000 people exposed to the
toxic plume released into lower Manhattan after the collapse of the
10
World Trade Center towers, as well as the rescue and recovery workers who arrived at the site more than ninety-six hours after the at11
tacks. This Comment asserts that Congress had no authority to cap

4

September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.2 (2004).
See ATSSSA § 101(a), 115 Stat. 230, 230 (authorizing executive action “to compensate air carriers for losses incurred by the air carriers as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001”). The legislative history of the ATSSSA is almost exclusively devoted to discussion of the airlines. 147
CONG. REC. S9589-604, H5884-919 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001).
6
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 408(a), 115 Stat. 230, 240.
Subsequent amendments also capped the liability of aircraft manufacturers, property
owners in the World Trade Center, airport owners, and governmental entities. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201(b)(2), 115 Stat. 597,
645-46 (2001). Throughout this Comment, any reference to maximum airline liability
or the available six billion dollars is a reference to all money available from those parties with legislatively limited liability with respect to 9/11.
7
See Steven Brill, A Tragic Calculus, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2001/Jan. 7, 2002, at 28,
29 (estimating six billion dollars in available insurance money).
8
See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 404(b), 115 Stat. 230,
240-41 (“There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to
pay the administrative and support costs for the Special Master in carrying out this title.”).
9
See Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Context of September 11, 88 VA.
L. REV. 1831, 1856 (2002) (noting that there is “no apparent argument” for these classifications “[w]ithin the community of victims”).
10
Thomas R. Frieden, Henry Falk & Timothy S. Carey, Remarks Announcing the
Launch of the World Trade Center Health Registry 13 (Sept. 5, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/wtc/transcript-0905.pdf).
11
See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 405(c)(2)(B)-(C), 115
Stat. 230, 239 (stating that an eligible individual must have been present at the site at
the time of the airplane crashes or “in the immediate aftermath”); 28 C.F.R. § 102.3
5
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the liability of the airlines with respect to those victims ineligible for
the Fund. It discusses the grounds on which the limited liability provision of the legislation should be held unconstitutional and proposes
that an alternative compensation scheme to anticipate and resolve the
claims of exposure-only injury victims should be created.
I. THE PROBLEM
A. The Purpose of the Victim Compensation Fund
The Fund is the largest single-incident social welfare program in
12
the history of the United States. Viewed in the light most generous
to Congress, it was the product of a compelling desire to assist those
13
most deeply and immediately impacted by the tragedy of 9/11.
14
Congress passed the ATSSSA only hours after it was drafted, produc15
ing minimal legislative history to indicate its intent. However, the
few references to the Fund in the debate over the ATSSSA made congressional intent clear:
To ensure that the victims and families of victims who were physically injured or killed on September 11th are compensated even if courts determine that the airlines and any other potential corporate defendants
are not liable for the harm; if insurance monies are exhausted; or are
consumed by massive punitive damage awards or attorneys’ fees, the bill
also creates a victims’ compensation fund. These victims and their families may, but are not required to, seek compensation from the Federal
fund instead of through the litigation system.
16
- Sen. John McCain
The heart of every American aches for those who died or have been injured because of the tragic terrorist attacks in New York, Virginia, and

(2004) (limiting “immediate aftermath” to within 96 hours after the crashes for rescue
workers, and to within 12 hours after the crashes for all other claimants).
12
See Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92 (noting that the U.S. government has never made such payments to victims of attacks,
natural disasters, or epidemics).
13
Although the overall legislation was to protect the airlines, the Fund was unquestionably a generous social welfare package intended to alleviate the suffering of
those most personally harmed on 9/11.
14
Belkin, supra note 12, at 92.
15
The legislative history of the ATSSSA is brief and almost entirely focused on
protecting the airlines. 147 CONG. REC. S9589-9604, H5884-5919 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
2001). The sparse references to the Fund are excerpted in text accompanying notes
16-20.
16
147 CONG. REC. S9594 (statement of Sen. McCain).
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Pennsylvania on September 11th. Our first priority should be ensuring
that their needs are met and that they receive compensation.
17
- Sen. Patrick Leahy
The Treasury of the United States has been opened by the Members of
this Congress to ensure that every family will receive just recovery.
18
- Rep. Jim Turner
It is paradoxical to fully support the airlines while reducing support for
survivors who need to resume their lives.
19
- Rep. Stephanie Tubbs Jones
Don’t we want to ensure that all legitimate plaintiffs receive compensation?
20
- Sen. Orrin Hatch
21

The statements of the Special Master of the Fund, Kenneth Feinberg,
also point to the purpose of the Fund:
The Fund provides an alternative to the significant risk, expense, and delay inherent in civil litigation by offering victims and their families an
opportunity to receive swift, inexpensive, and predictable resolution of
claims. The Fund provides an unprecedented level of federal financial as22
sistance for surviving victims and the families of deceased victims.

Despite the admirable purpose expressed by those associated with the
Fund, the eligibility requirements of the Fund were insurmountable
23
for many. The Special Master’s definition of eligibility, although a
practical response to the challenge presented to him, gave rise to the
problem of precluded recovery for those victims not meeting his strict
definition.
B. Defining Eligibility
Title IV defines eligible claimants as those individuals who were
present at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, or crash site at Shanks-

17

147 CONG. REC. S9599 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
147 CONG. REC. H5906 (statement of Rep. Turner).
19
147 CONG. REC. H5905 (statement of Rep. Jones).
20
147 CONG. REC. S9595 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
21
The Special Master was appointed by the Attorney General and empowered to,
inter alia, “promulgate all procedural and substantive rules for the administration of
[the Fund].” September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
§ 404(a)(2), 115 Stat. 230, 238.
22
67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2003).
23
66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,276-80 (Dec. 21, 2001).
18
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ville, Pennsylvania “at the time, or in the immediate aftermath, of the
terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001; and suffered
24
physical harm or death as a result of such an air crash.” This language raises the question: who suffered “physical harm” in “the immediate aftermath” of 9/11?
C. Defining Physical Harm
1. Physical Harm Compensable by the Fund
The Final Rule defines the physical harm necessary to be eligible
for the Fund as:
[A] physical injury to the body that was treated by a medical professional
within 24 hours of the injury having been sustained, or within 24 hours
of rescue, or within 72 hours of injury or rescue for those victims who
were unable to realize immediately the extent of their injuries or for
whom treatment by a medical professional was not available on Septem25
ber 11 . . . .

Although Title IV grants the Special Master the power to define harm
26
as necessary to the adjudication of the Fund, the Fund’s definition of
harm is different from the definition of physical harm developed by
modern tort law. Despite recognition of exposure-only injuries as a
27
class of injury in recent mass toxic tort decisions, the Final Rule spe28
cifically excludes exposure-only injuries from eligibility. These are
victims who were exposed to carcinogens and toxins released into the
air when the WTC towers collapsed and who may not manifest symptoms of disease for many years. The Special Master presented an administrative justification for excluding exposure-only victims from the
Fund: victims who never manifest an injury would be overcompensated if they were compensated today; victims who manifest severe injuries might be undercompensated if they receive an estimated com24

September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 405(c)(2)(A), 115 Stat.
230, 239 (2001).
25
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(c)(1)
(2004).
26
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 404(a), 115 Stat. 230,
237-38.
27
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 853 (1999) (recognizing the
“divergent interests of the presently injured and future claimants”); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (recognizing “the interest of the exposureonly plaintiffs”).
28
See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(a)(e) (2004) (establishing eligibility definitions and requirements).
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29

pensation today. The Special Master went on to say that “[w]hile
Congress might later consider whether an administrative program for
latent harm caused by the September 11, 2001 terrorist-related aircraft
crashes may be appropriate, the language of the statute that created
30
this Fund does not contemplate awards for that purpose.” This recognition of the possibility of latent injuries is one of the few acknowledgments that a congressional response may be necessary. Without a
congressional response, the members of this recognized class of victims
will never recover for their injuries.
2. Physical Harm Compensable at Common Law
Under the Fund legislation, any litigation relating to the events of
the 9/11 attacks, including lawsuits for personal injuries, must be
brought as a federal cause of action in the Southern District of New
York and will be controlled by the law “of the State in which the crash
31
occurred.” Professor Robert Rabin has surveyed the potential causes
32
of action available to exposure-only 9/11 victims: emotional distress
33
over prospective future physical harm (“cancerphobia”), medical
34
35
monitoring, and present probabilistic recovery for future harm.
Applying New York’s case law to potential claims of exposure-only vic36
tims of 9/11, Rabin concluded that cancerphobia claims are unlikely

29

September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001: Interim Final Rule, 66
Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,276 (Dec. 21, 2001) (Statement by the Special Master).
30
Id.
31
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 408(b)(2), 115 Stat. 230,
241. This Comment does not discuss the exposure-only victims from the Pentagon.
The collapse of the towers created a massive class of victims in New York that does not
exist in Virginia. Should studies indicate that the damage caused to the Pentagon created a sufficiently dangerous environment, those exposed to that environment should
be eligible for compensation with the New York exposure-only victims.
32
Rabin, supra note 9, at 1861-65.
33
A cancerphobia claim is for compensation of the victim for the fear of developing cancer independent of whether cancer ever develops. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1206 n.24 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing cases dealing with “cancerphobia” claims).
34
A medical monitoring claim is for the ongoing payment of any medical costs
incurred for proactive or preventative medical treatment. DOMINICK VETRI ET AL.,
TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 381 (2d ed. 2002).
35
A present probabilistic recovery for future harm claim is for the immediate
compensation of a potential injury whose monetary value is determined by the probability of that injury manifesting and the probable severity of that manifested injury.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIAL ON TORTS 459-61 (7th ed. 2000).
36
Rabin, supra note 9, at 1861-65.
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37

to succeed. Medical monitoring claims, on the other hand, would be
38
“fairly strong,” while present probabilistic recovery is an “open ques39
tion in New York.” Ultimately, Rabin concluded that “uncertainty is
the byword for the exposure only claimant in both the liability and the
40
Although he reached no definitive conclusion,
health spheres.”
Rabin’s article indicated that exposure-only victims do have common
law rights and their injuries cannot be dismissed as collateral damage.
While Rabin asserted that the exposure-only victims may have a
valid legal claim, whether those claims have any hope of success is an
entirely different question. The Special Master has, on multiple occasions, dismissed the chances of success of any lawsuits stemming from
41
the events of 9/11. In an effort to encourage potential claimants to
opt into the Fund, he speculatively compared the experience of litigating a tort claim with the experience of filing a claim with the Fund:
[The alternative] is the idea of litigating . . . for seven or eight or nine
years, hopefully getting a verdict, hopefully having it sustained on appeal, then paying your lawyer 40 percent of a fee, and then netting
something at the end of the day while dragging through constantly remembering the horror of September 11, this is an alternative program, an alterna42
tive.

The Special Master was referring to the families of people killed on
9/11. Unlike exposure-only victims, these parties would not face the
burden of proving causation in court. Among other hurdles, victims
who manifest cancer in fifteen years caused by the toxins inhaled on
September 11 will be required by a court to prove that their cancer
must have been caused by the September 11 plume. Although expo-

37

Id. at 1862-63.
Id. at 1863-64.
39
Id. at 1864-65. Professor Rabin compares Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232
(Pa. 1996) (holding, under the “two-disease rule” that claimants can sue for emotional
distress and probabilistic recovery only for whatever disease they are suffering from at
the time they sue) and Mauro v. Raymark Industries, 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989) (holding
that if a reasonable medical probability that the disease will develop can be established,
present recovery for that disease will be permitted).
40
Rabin, supra note 9, at 1865.
41
See Robert S. Kelner & Gail S. Kelner, Victim Compensation Fund: An Update,
N.Y.L.J., May 28, 2002, at 3 (“Mr. Feinberg has described the Victim Compensation
Fund on numerous occasions as ‘the only game in town.’”); Newsnight with Aaron Brown
(CNN television broadcast, Feb. 4, 2002) (reporting on the Special Master’s statement
that “suing the airlines is a dead end”), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com
/TRANSCRIPTS/0202/04/asb.00.html.
42
Newsnight with Aaron Brown, supra note 41 (emphasis added).
38
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sure-only victims have a justiciable claim, the obstacles to prevailing on
such a claim could very well be insurmountable.
43

3. Likelihood of Manifestation of Latent Injuries

It is possible that no serious injuries will ever manifest in those individuals exposed to the 9/11 plume. However, reflecting on the
dicta of courts imploring the legislature to implement an extrajudicial solution to resolve the litigation problems arising from mass
44
toxic torts, it would still be wise to implement a solution now and
hope there is never reason to use it. Although opponents will argue
that this is a wasteful strategy, the scientific evidence indicates that
there is a likelihood that this problem will arise.
The earliest evaluations of the air quality following the collapse of
the WTC towers were on September 17, 2001—six days after the toxic
45
plume covered lower Manhattan. The delay leaves uncertain the accuracy of studies determining actual levels of toxicity in the plume
46
and the effects of direct exposure to the plume. Studies attempting
43

Needless to say, the scientific community has undertaken countless studies of
the medical and environmental effects of the 9/11 plume. For lack of a better place to
start, the reports and data discussed here are taken exclusively from the report of the
New York Fire Department medical staff and studies conducted by the government
agencies charged with monitoring the effects of 9/11 on human health. Bear in mind
that subsequent analyses have charged the government with being overly optimistic
about the danger posed by the plume. See generally SUZANNE MATTEI, SIERRA CLUB,
POLLUTION AND DECEPTION AT GROUND ZERO: HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S
RECKLESS DISREGARD OF 9/11 TOXIC HAZARDS POSES LONG-TERM THREATS FOR NEW
YORK CITY AND THE NATION (2004), at http://www.sierraclub.com/groundzero/
report.pdf.
44
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (“[T]his litigation defies
customary judicial administration and calls for national legislation.”); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997) (“The benefits asbestos-exposed persons
might gain from the establishment of a grand-scale compensation scheme is a matter
fit for legislative consideration.”).
45
See Ctr. for Disease Control, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Occupational Exposures to Air Contaminants at the World Trade Center Disaster Site—New York, September-October
2001, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 453 (2002) (reporting that environmental sampling took place between September 18 and October 4); David J. Prezant et
al., Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness in Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site, 347
NEW ENG. J. MED. 806 (2002) (“[M]ost samples were obtained after September 17,
2001, when substantial settling of dust had already occurred.”).
46
See Nat’l Ctr. for Envtl. Assessment, EPA, Exposure and Human Health Evaluation of Airborne Pollution from the World Trade Center Disaster (External Review
Draft) 122 (2002), at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=54667
[hereinafter Exposure Evaluation] (“[V]ery little data are available to quantify exposures which could have occurred in the hours and days following the collapse of the
WTC towers.”); Paul D. Scanlon, World Trade Center Cough—A Lingering Legacy and a
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to report on air quality immediately following the collapse of the
buildings are markedly pessimistic as compared to government studies
47
based on the quality of air one week after the event. The validity of
some of the government conclusions has been questioned, and even
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has admitted that it may
48
have misled the public regarding the air quality at the WTC site. The
one thing on which all the studies agree is that it is not possible to rule
out the possibility of long-term injury to the exposure-only victims of
9/11.
a. Harm to Firefighters
Dr. David Prezant, the Chief Medical Officer for the New York
City Fire Department, studied the post-9/11 respiratory health of New
49
York City firefighters. Ninety percent of all firefighters complained
of “severe respiratory-related cough and symptomatology” after expo50
sure to the site. Prezant noted “there was clinically significant respi-

Cautionary Tale, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 840, 841-42 (2002) (“Although the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention did not identify harmful levels in air samples, the
sampling was undertaken after most airway injury had already occurred.”). This information is presented not as an indictment of the EPA or any other agency but to remind the reader that we are acting with imperfect information and have no way of
knowing how severe the initial exposure was. “[A] major uncertainty for the evaluations presented in this report is the lack of information on exposures which could have
occurred within that first critical week after September 11.” Exposure Evaluation, supra, at 123.
47
See Jane Key, Ground Zero Air Was “Brutal” for Months, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 10,
2003, at A1 (reporting on a study by Dr. Thomas Cahill finding that the immediate
impact of the 9/11 plume was significantly more severe than later tests of air quality
indicated).
48
See EPA Inspector General Admits to Problems Following Sept. 11, NATION’S HEALTH,
Nov. 1, 2003, at 7 (“The Environmental Protection Agency may have misled the public
about air quality following the collapse of the World Trade Center towers in New York
City in 2001, according to a report from the agency’s inspector general.”); EPA’s Fog
over Lower Manhattan, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, at 32 (“[T]he EPA inspector
general said last month that the White House Council on Environmental Quality
pushed the agency to issue reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones about the
air quality downtown.”); Kirk Johnson & Jennifer 8. Lee, When Breathing Is Believing:
New Yorkers Doubt E.P.A. Credibility on Air Safety, but Truth Is Complex, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2003, at 40 (reporting Congressman Jerrold Nadler’s belief that “people would die because of what he saw as collusion between the E.P.A. and the White House”).
49
See generally Prezant et al., supra note 45 (examining data from fire fighters who
had been exposed to inhaled materials during and after the 9/11 attacks on the World
Trade Center).
50
CDC Telebriefing Transcript: 9-11-02 Special Issue Examines Health Effects Related
to World Trade Center Terrorist Attacks (Sept. 9, 2002), at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/
media/transcripts/t020909.htm.
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ratory exposure” among firefighters exposed to the plume but who
51
were asymptomatic of “World Trade Center cough.” He concluded
that “[w]hether symptoms and hyperreactivity in firefighters who
worked at the World Trade Center site will prove persistent, resulting
in reactive airways dysfunction syndrome or airway remodeling, re52
quires long-term study.” In extrapolating his findings to the population of workers and residents of lower Manhattan, Prezant speculated
about two alternatives: the negative health effects will be comparatively lower in the non-firefighter population because of the lower levels of exposure or the negative health effects will be comparatively
53
higher because of the superior respiratory health of firefighters.
Other studies favor the latter speculation, noting the presence of several high-risk groups (e.g., children, smokers) among the general
54
population.
b. Harm to the General Population
Two months after the attack, eighty-two percent of residents of
lower Manhattan surveyed by the New York City Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene (NYCDOHMH) and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) reported continued or increased nose or throat

51

Prezant et al., supra note 45, at 813. See id. at 806 (“‘World Trade Center cough’
was defined as a persistent cough that developed in a firefighter after exposure to the
site and that was accompanied by respiratory symptoms severe enough to require
medical leave for at least four weeks.”). Eight percent of the firefighters present at the
time the buildings collapsed developed WTC cough. Id. at 807 fig.1. Of those present
at the site between September 11 and September 13, over three percent developed
WTC cough. Id.
52
Id. at 814. Other studies have similarly called for long-term observation of the
respiratory health of exposed firefighters and have made varying predictions about the
long-term effects of exposure. See Ctr. for Disease Control, Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., Injuries and Illnesses Among New York City Fire Department Rescue Workers After Responding to the World Trade Center Attacks, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 5 (2002) (“[A]n estimated 500 FDNY firefighters (4% of the 11,336
total FDNY firefighter workforce) might eventually qualify for disability retirement because of persistent respiratory conditions.”).
53
Prezant et al., supra note 45, at 814. Because any respiratory disease, including
asthma, prevents firefighters from working at the scene of a fire, the respiratory health
of the general population will be more susceptible to hazardous exposures. Id.
54
N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE & AGENCY FOR TOXIC
SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, WORLD TRADE CTR. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT WORKING
GROUP, FINAL REP. OF THE PUB. HEALTH INVESTIGATION TO ASSESS POTENTIAL
EXPOSURES TO AIRBORNE AND SETTLED SURFACE DUST IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF
LOWER MANHATTAN 31 (2002) [hereinafter FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT] (noting the
populations of people who are more sensitive to exposure to dangerous material).
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55

irritation, eye irritation or infection, or cough. Of residents of lower
Manhattan with previously diagnosed asthma, twenty-seven percent
56
identified worsening symptoms after 9/11. In the Final Report of the
Public Health Investigation to Assess Potential Exposures to Airborne and Settled Surface Dust in Residential Areas of Lower Manhattan, the
NYCDOHMH and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR), a division of the Department of Health and Human Services, took samples from lower Manhattan between November 4, 2001
57
Basing their analysis on these samples,
and December 11, 2001.
taken two months after the toxic event, the study was unable to rule
out long-term negative health consequences of continued exposure to
58
the area. Without giving any consideration to the impact of direct
59
60
plume inhalation, the study considered lung cancer, mesothelioma,
61
and silicosis to be potential long-term hazards to individuals exposed
to the site.
A study conducted by the CDC National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (CDC NIOSH) found that twenty to thirty
percent of surveyed workers at a high school and college near the
WTC site reported symptoms of eye irritation, nose/throat irritation,
62
cough, and shortness of breath four to six months after the attacks.
Reporting on the study, Dr. Bruce Bernard of the CDC NIOSH noted
the striking “similarity between the prevalence of symptoms and the
63
types of symptoms” at the different sites surveyed. The study called
for “further assessment to describe the nature and extent of illness in
specific working groups as well as individual medical follow-up . . . to
64
address workers’ occupational health needs.” Even the most optimistic of these studies called for continued attention to the health of
55

Ctr. for Disease Control, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Community Needs Assessment of Lower Manhattan Residents Following the World Trade Center Attacks—Manhattan,
New York City, 2001, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 10-11
(2002).
56
Ctr. for Disease Control, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Self-Reported Increase in
Asthma Severity After the September 11 Attacks on the World Trade Center—Manhattan, New
York, 2001, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 781 (2002).
57
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 41.
58
Id. at 42.
59
Id. at 35-36, 39-40.
60
Id. at 39-40. Mesothelioma is a lung disease caused by exposure to asbestos particles.
61
Id. at 34-35. Silicosis is lung damage caused by silica deposits in the lung.
62
CDC Telebriefing Transcript, supra note 50.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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those exposed to the WTC site. These studies recognized that there is
a class of September 11 victims who have or will have medical needs
and that not only have they not been positively addressed by Congress,
but Congress has made it more difficult for these victims to receive the
compensation to which they are entitled.
II. LIMITED LIABILITY RESULTS IN
LIMITED RECOVERY
Section 408 of Title IV states: “[L]iability for all claims, whether
for compensatory or punitive damages, arising from the terroristrelated aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, against any air carrier
shall not be in an amount greater than the limits of the liability cover65
age maintained by the air carrier.” This provision limits the amount
available to all plaintiffs with claims arising out of September 11 to
approximately six billion dollars, a figure dwarfed by estimates of
66
eighty-five billion dollars in property damage alone. Accordingly, it
is unlikely that any of the six billion dollars will be available beyond
67
the initial claims for property damage. With this in mind, and in
conjunction with the potential problem of exposure-only victims, it is
reasonable to conclude that Congress has precluded individuals who
will eventually manifest injuries caused by exposure to the 9/11 plume
68
from ever recovering from the airlines.
Thus, the question arises: does Congress have the authority to
limit the recovery of these potential plaintiffs? Statutory limitations of
liability are permissible as economic regulations under the Commerce
Clause when the regulation bears a “rational relationship” to a con-

65

September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. 107-42, § 408(a),
115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001).
66
Brill, supra note 7, at 29 (estimating one hundred billion dollars in claims
against the approximately six billion dollars available under Title IV); Adam Miller,
Seething, Grieving on WTC $$, N.Y. POST, Dec. 22, 2001, at 7 (quoting an attorney who
predicted approximately eighty-five billion dollars in property damage claims and fifteen billion dollars in death claims against approximately six billion dollars in available
insurance money).
67
One attorney commented that the six billion dollars would “probably be
enough to handle” the claims of the thirty-eight passengers killed on United Airlines
Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania. Miller, supra note 66, at 7. Although the
survivors of those thirty-eight passengers are eligible for the Fund, this statement provides an estimate of potential jury awards.
68
See Rabin, supra note 9, at 1858-59 (discussing the depletion of available insurance funds prior to the manifestation of injuries in exposure-only victims).
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69

gressional concern. Here, there is no rational relationship between
exposure-only victims and the airlines’ limited liability. Making the
exposure-only victims bear the burden of protecting the financial interests of the airlines is an unconstitutional extension of congressional
power. Under Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
70
Inc., there is an insufficient relationship between the exposure-only
victims and the airlines’ limited liability to justify the legislation under
the Commerce Clause.
A. Authority to Limit Liability
In Duke Power, the Supreme Court held that the liability limitations
71
of the Price-Anderson Act did not render Price-Anderson an uncon72
stitutional violation of due process or equal protection. The PriceAnderson Act provides indemnification to private parties participating
in the construction or operation of nuclear power facilities and limits
their liability on the condition that they obtain the maximum private
73
insurance available and waive most affirmative defenses. Should a
nuclear disaster occur and a party’s liability exceed the limitation, section 2210(e) provides that Congress will “take whatever action is de69

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978).
If the limiting clause is determined to be constitutional as an economic regulation, it
raises the question of whether by precluding recovery for a valid cause of action, this
clause constitutes a taking. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]here is no question
that claims for compensation are property interests that cannot be taken for public use
without compensation.” In re Aircrash in Bali, Indon. on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301,
1312 (9th Cir. 1982). A resolution of this question is immaterial to the argument presented here except to fortify the notion that if Congress does not provide a solution to
this problem, the litigation necessary to determine liability and damages will be further
compounded by takings litigation against the government. Extended and painful litigation for 9/11 victims is precisely what Congress should work to avoid.
70
438 U.S. at 83-84.
71
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000).
72
See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 84, 93-94 (holding that the Price-Anderson Act
“passes constitutional muster” and finding no equal protection violation because the
Act’s liability limitations were “general[ly] rational[]”).
73
42 U.S.C. § 2210(a)-(e), (n) (2000). Specifically, the defenses that must be
waived are:
(i) any issue or defense as to conduct of the claimant or fault of persons indemnified, (ii) any issue or defense as to charitable or governmental immunity, and (iii) any issue or defense based on any statute of limitations if suit is
instituted within three years from the date on which the claimant first knew,
or reasonably could have known, of his injury or damage and the cause
thereof.
Id. § 2210(n)(1); see also Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 65 & n.5 (explaining the waiver
provision of the Price-Anderson Act).
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termined to be necessary (including approval of appropriate compensation plans and appropriation of funds) to provide full and prompt
compensation to the public for all public liability claims resulting
74
from a disaster of such magnitude.” The Court put tremendous em75
phasis on this provision in its opinion.
The district court in Duke Power struck down the Price-Anderson
Act on the grounds that “[t]he amount of recovery is not rationally related to the potential losses” and “[t]here is no quid pro quo” for the
76
liability limitations. The court also found an equal protection violation because the Act “placed the cost of [nuclear power] on an arbitrarily chosen segment of society, those injured by nuclear catastro77
phe.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Price-Anderson
78
provided for constitutional economic regulation. The grounds for
reversal in Duke Power do not exist in the case of 9/11 exposure-only
victims.
1. Arbitrary and Irrational
There is a “presumption of constitutionality generally accorded
economic regulations and [those regulations are] upheld absent
79
proof of arbitrariness or irrationality on the part of Congress.” However, under the standards of arbitrariness and irrationality set forth in
Duke Power, the liability limitation of Title IV of the ATSSSA is unconstitutional.
In Duke Power, the appellees challenged the amount at which li80
ability was capped on the grounds that it was an arbitrary figure. The
Court upheld the limitation:
The reasonableness of the statute’s assumed ceiling on liability was
predicated on two corollary considerations—expert appraisals of the exceedingly small risk of a nuclear incident involving claims in excess of

74

42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2).
See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 65-67 (discussing the legislative history and intent
of the limited liability provision).
76
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 431 F. Supp.
203, 222-23 (W.D.N.C. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1977).
77
Id. at 225. The equal protection claim was not made to the Supreme Court in
Duke Power. 438 U.S. at 93.
78
See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 83 (describing the limited liability provision as “a
classic example of economic regulation” and thus presumed constitutional unless
proven to be arbitrary or irrational).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 84.
75
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$560 million, and the recognition that in the event of such an incident,
Congress would likely enact extraordinary relief provisions to provide
81
additional relief, in accord with prior practice.

Neither of these predicates exists for Title IV.
In the case of 9/11, the relevant event has already occurred. A
potential event is not a concern, and the estimates of actual damage
82
far exceed the six billion dollar limitation of liability. The “additional relief” from Congress anticipated by the Court in Duke Power is
in fact the legislation that limited the amount recoverable by victims.
The Court in Duke Power pointed to the legislative history of the PriceAnderson Act, specifically a statement that “[t]he limitation of liability
serves primarily as a device for facilitating further congressional review
of such a situation, rather than as an ultimate bar to further relief of
83
the public.” The Price-Anderson limitation created a starting point;
the Title IV limitation is the end point. Title IV is intended to constitute the entirety of congressional assistance to the victims of 9/11, but
in the case of exposure-only victims, it is an arbitrary and irrational
bar to recovery.
2. Quid Pro Quo
The Court in Duke Power declined to resolve the question of
whether quid pro quo is required for the abrogation of the commonlaw right of recovery because the Price-Anderson Act provides a suffi84
cient substitute for the right. The Court discussed at length the ade85
quacy of the substituted right, raising the question: if the Court was
not inclined to require quid pro quo, why did it provide such a thorough analysis of the requirement? One might infer that despite the

81

Id. at 85.
See supra note 66 (noting one commentator’s estimate that there are approximately one hundred billion dollars in potential Title IV claims).
83
Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 86 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-883, at 7 (1965)).
84
Id. at 87-88; see also Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 474 U.S. 892, 894-95
(1985) (denial of certiorari) (White, J., dissenting) (“Whether due process requires a
legislatively enacted compensation scheme to be a quid pro quo for the common-law or
state-law remedy it replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be, thus appears to be an
issue unresolved by this Court.”).
85
See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 87-93 (discussing the remedy mechanism under
the Price-Anderson Act).
82
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Court’s declining to affirmatively resolve the question, this lengthy
86
analysis indicates the Court’s valuation of the requirement.
Should the Court decide quid pro quo is mandated by the Due
Process Clause, the ATSSSA offers no substitute to individuals with latent injuries for terminating their right to recover. The legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act relied on by the Court predicted exactly the situation created by Title IV:
It should be emphasized, moreover, that it is collecting a judgment, not
filing a lawsuit, that counts. Even if defenses are waived under state law,
a defendant with theoretically “unlimited” liability may be unable to pay
a judgment once obtained. When the defendant’s assets are exhausted
by earlier judgments, subsequent claimants would be left with uncollectable awards. The prospect of inequitable distribution would produce a
race to the courthouse door in contrast to the present system of assured
87
orderly and equitable compensation.

In Duke Power, the Court found that the $560 million fund, supplemented by Congress’ assurance that all additional damages would
be compensated, was a “reasonable substitute” for the opportunity to
88
recover damages through litigation. The Court also endorsed an
amended distribution scheme under the Price-Anderson Act that took
89
into account the possibility of latent injuries. The Court noted the
value of an administrative fund in lieu of litigation for adjudicating
the rights of individuals with latent injuries: “[t]he statutory scheme
insures the equitable distribution of benefits to all who suffer injury—
90
both immediate and latent.” The Court further observed that “under the common-law route, the proverbial race to the courthouse
would . . . determine who had ‘first crack’ at the diminishing re86

See John Vail, A Common Lawyer Looks at State Constitutions, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 977,
988 (2001) (describing Duke Power as “suggesting strongly that the quid pro quo doctrine
was a federal constitutional mandate”).
87
See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 89-90 (quoting Possible Modification or Extension of the Price-Anderson Insurance and Indemnity Act of 1957: Hearings on H.R.
8631 Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 (1975) (statement
of William A. Anders, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n)).
88
Id. at 91.
89
According to the Duke Power Court:
The claim-administration procedures under the Act provide that in the
event of an accident with potential liability exceeding the $560 million ceiling, no more than 15% of the limit can be distributed pending court approval of a plan of distribution taking into account the need to assure compensation for “possible latent injury claims which may not be discovered until
a later time.”
Id. at 92.
90
Id.
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sources of the tortfeasor, and fairness could well be sacrificed in the
91
process.” Although one hesitates to ask that the tort system be fair, it
does not seem too much to ask that a fundamental unfairness be
eradicated.
Title IV caps the liability of parties liable for injuries stemming
from 9/11 but provides no substitute to a potentially huge class of exposure-only plaintiffs. Adequate compensation to members of the
manifested-injury class is not a sufficient justification to deprive mem92
bers of the exposure-only class of their rights. No matter how strong
the justification of Congress in limiting the liability of the 9/11 parties, it does not satisfy even rational basis scrutiny with respect to the
exposure-only plaintiffs. The limitation clause expressly violates the
93
stated purpose of Title IV. While economic legislation is permissible
under rational scrutiny, the courts cannot accept that a narrow group
of people—here the exposure-only victims—bears the burden of economically sustaining the airlines. If Congress wishes to provide economic support to the airlines, as it clearly does, it should do so by providing compensation to all victims who could sue the airlines, not just
to those with the easiest cases.
III. A PROPOSAL
This Comment proposes a fund designed to track and compensate
those exposure-only victims of September 11 who manifest disease
connected to their exposure to the 9/11 plume. Called the Latent Injury Fund, this fund should be loosely based on the existing Victim
Compensation Fund and can rely on the existing World Trade Center
Health Registry to identify applicants.
A. The Registry
The fundamental mechanism necessary to track those individuals
potentially suffering latent injuries from exposure to the 9/11 plume
is already in place. On September 5, 2003, the NYCDHMH, ATSDR,
and the CDC National Center for Environmental Health (CDC
NCEH) announced the formation of the World Trade Center Health

91

Id.
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (recognizing “the
interest of exposure-only plaintiffs”).
93
See supra text accompanying note 3 (citing the Act’s legislative intent to compensate any individual injured on September 11).
92

1364

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 1347

94

Registry (the “Registry”). The Registry is a “comprehensive and confidential health survey of those most directly exposed to the events of
9/11” designed to track the physical and mental health of those sur95
veyed. The Registry tracks:
• People who were in a building, on the street, or on the
subway south of Chambers Street on 9/11/01.
• People involved in rescue, recovery, or clean up, or other
activities at the WTC site and/or WTC Recovery Operations on Staten Island any time between 9/11/01 and
6/30/02.
• Students and staff in schools (pre-K through 12) or day
care centers south of Canal Street on 9/11/01.
• People who were living south of Canal Street on
96
9/11/01.
In establishing its purpose, the Registry’s materials note that
“[t]he full impact of this unprecedented event on health may not be
known for years. We do not know if there are any long-term health
effects among those who lived or worked near the WTC site on
97
9/11.” In turn, the Registry’s purpose is to “understand the possible
98
health consequences related to 9/11.”

94

Press Release, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, World
Trade Center Health Registry Created to Track and Evaluate Any Long-Term Health
Effects of 9/11 (Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/
public/press03/pr119-0905.html. The Registry operates in cooperation with the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Columbia University, Fire Department of New York City, John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Mount
Sinai Medical Center, New York University, New York School System, New Jersey Department of Health, and Hunter College. World Trade Center Health Registry, About
the World Trade Center (WTC) Health Registry, at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
doh/html/wtc/about.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
95
WORLD TRADE CTR. HEALTH REGISTRY, N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL
HYGIENE, HOW TO ENROLL IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH REGISTRY (2003)
[hereinafter HOW TO ENROLL], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/
html/wtc/Brochure.pdf.
96
Id.
97
Id. In a direct appeal to the target population, the Registry expresses the same
sentiment:
Even if you have been healthy since 9/11, it is important for you to sign up.
In order to have a full and accurate picture of any long-term health effects related to 9/11, both people who have been healthy and people who have been
ill are strongly encouraged to enroll in the WTC Health Registry.
HOW TO ENROLL, supra note 95, at 2.
98
Id. at 1.
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Registry organizers believe that registration of even 20,000 of the
300,000 eligible participants would provide a sufficient base to con99
duct valuable research. As of September 30, 2003, only twenty-five
days after opening registration, 12,902 people had already preenrolled in the Registry and the Registry had obtained contact infor100
mation for 27,140 additional targeted individuals. As of September
10, 2004, 61,087 people had been registered and interviewed by the
101
The Registry was advertised extensively in the New York
Registry.
102
103
City subway system and PATH and publicized by the news media
indicating there will be sufficient participation to ensure accurate results. Should these results indicate long-term health consequences to
the exposure-only victims, there must be an assistance scheme already
104
in place. Although in the Final Report, the Special Master did not
recommend prospective legislation establishing a victim compensa105
tion fund for future catastrophic events, these victims can be distinguished. They are not potential victims. They are identifiable individuals with the potential to manifest disease. Both the events causing
the harm and their resulting injuries have already occurred. In fact, a
small group of victims filed claims with the Fund but were rejected be-

99

Frieden, supra note 10, at 17-18, 23.
N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Initial Information from the World
Trade Center Health Registry—Data Through September 30, 2003, DATA SNAPSHOT:
UNDERSTANDING THE HEALTH IMPACT OF 9/11, at 1 (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/pdf/wtc/wtc-report200310.pdf.
101
N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, The WTCHR Quarterly Enrollment
Update Data Through Friday, September 10, 2004, DATA SNAPSHOT: UNDERSTANDING THE
HEALTH IMPACT OF 9/11, at 1, Nov. 2004, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/
pdf/wtc/wtc-report2004-1112.pdf.
102
Press Release, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, City
Health Department Launches Subway Campaign Promoting Enrollment in the World
Trade Center Health Registry (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/doh/html/public/press03/pr136-1008.html; see also World Trade Ctr. Health
Registry, Press Room, at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/wtc/ads.html (advertising the Registry).
103
See Laurie Garrett, Huge Study of Health Impact; 20-Year Survey to Track Thousands,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 6, 2003, at A2 (announcing the launch of the Registry in a Long Island
daily newspaper); Kirk Johnson, Inquiry Opens Into Effects of 9/11 Dust, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
6, 2003, at B1 (announcing the launch of the Registry in a New York City daily newspaper); Rock Positano, 9-11 Registry Tracks Health, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 7, 2003, at 34
(same); Sam Smith, Feds Launch Long-Term Studies, N.Y. POST, Aug. 10, 2003, at 17
(same).
104
1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE
SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf.
105
Id., at 83-84.
100
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cause they did not meet the strict eligibility requirements.
If New
York City and the federal government feel a need to track those ex107
posed to the 9/11 plume, it seems intuitive that there should be a
solution in place if members of the observed population develop re108
lated illnesses.
B. A New Fund
Mass toxic tort litigation is a nightmare. With the possible excep109
tion of the Agent Orange litigation, events leading to toxic exposure
have never been as traumatic as the events of 9/11. Although not a
singular driving force, protecting 9/11 victims from being forced to
undertake litigation was certainly an objective of the Victim Compen110
One need only glance at the litigation surrounding
sation Fund.
Agent Orange exposure to get a measure of the pain caused by ex111
tended litigation, or at asbestos litigation to see the damage and ex106

Many Sept. 11 Injury Claims Rejected, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 1, 2004.
The first two years of the Registry are funded at twenty million dollars through
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Frieden, supra note 10, at 16.
Additionally, a five year study of seven thousand Ground Zero workers being conducted by Mount Sinai hospital has been federally funded at ninety million dollars.
Paul H.B. Shin, Ground Zero Workers Still Suffering, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 29, 2003, at 8.
108
See Garrett, supra note 103, at A2 (citing a New York Environmental Law and
Justice Project attorney describing the Registry as “too little, too late”); Maggie
Haberman, Unions Rip WTC Health Registry, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 27, 2003, at 28 (reporting on unions dismissing the Registry because it does not provide any referrals for
or increased access to health care).
109
See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1987).
The court stated:
The correspondence to the court . . . amply demonstrate[s] that this litigation
is viewed by many as something more than an action for damages for personal
injuries. To some, it is a method of public protest at perceived national indifference to Vietnam veterans; to others, an organizational rallying point for
those veterans. Thus, although the precise legal claim is one for damages for
personal injuries, the district court accurately noted that the plaintiffs were
also seeking ‘larger remedies and emotional compensation’ that were beyond
its power to award.
Id. (internally quoting the district court’s opinion, 597 F. Supp. 740, 747 (E.D.N.Y
1984)).
110
See supra text accompanying note 16.
111
See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 747 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that the settlement “gives the class
more than it would likely achieve by attempting to litigate to the death”). The district
court also commented on its inability to heal all the plaintiffs’ pain:
The court has been deeply moved by its contact with members of the plaintiffs’ class from all over the nation and abroad. Many do deserve better of
their country. Had this court the power to rectify past wrongs—actual or per107
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112

pense caused by protracted litigation.
The Special Master said:
“[Title IV] is written in such a way that if [claimants] decide to litigate,
the likelihood of success, the likelihood of receiving a substantial
113
Although the Special
award in court, is substantially diminished.”
Master justified the limited nature of the Fund by characterizing the
Fund’s true purpose as a cathartic act necessary to the recovery of the
114
Nation, not the victims, this characterization is incongruous with the
115
Additionally, it was the Special Master
stated purpose of the Fund.
who acted as the town crier with respect to the horrors of the justice
system that awaited potential litigants. With this background in mind,
it seems irresponsible to force those who eventually manifest diseases
caused by WTC exposure to resort to litigation with little hope of re116
Once the original Fund
covering compensation for their injuries.
has soothed the pain of the Nation, are we to leave all other victims
to suffer in silence?

ceived—it would do so. But no single litigation can lift all of plaintiffs’ burdens. The legislative and executive branches of government—state and federal—and the Veterans Administration, as well as our many private and quasipublic medical and social agencies, are far more capable than this court of
shaping the larger remedies and emotional compensation plaintiffs seek.
Id.
112

Edwin Chen, Bush Backs Asbestos Tort Fund, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at A19
(“President Bush . . . threw his weight behind a congressional effort to create an industry-financed trust fund to compensate tens of thousands of victims of asbestos-caused
diseases, an effort to resolve the longest-running mass tort litigation in U.S. history.”).
Professor Rabin has similarly noted this effect of asbestos litigation:
[C]onsider that the continuing deluge of asbestos litigation has bankrupted
an industry . . . disrupted the judicial system far beyond any other mass tort
episode in history, and created dramatic disparities in reparation among injury victims—all with no end in sight and over a twenty-five-year period—with
no response from Congress.
Rabin, supra note 9, at 1831.
113
Joan Bernott Maginnis, The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund: Overview and Comment, at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/VictimFund.PDF; see also Rabin,
supra note 9, at 1838 (“Even though tort remains an option, the Fund can implicitly be
viewed as a statement of the perceived inadequacies of the tort remedy in meeting the
call for an immediate response to the needs of the September 11 victims.”).
114
FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 104, at 80 (“It is not the victims that justify the
Fund, but rather the response of the entire nation the tragedy.”).
115
See supra Part I.A.
116
See supra note 67 (discussing the disparity between the anticipated claims and
available insurance money); Rabin, supra note 9, at 1859-65 (discussing the challenges
of recovering in tort facing exposure-only victims); Kenneth G. Kubes, “United We
Stand”: Managing Choice-of-Law Problems in September-11-Based Toxic Torts Through Federal
Substantive Mass-Tort Law, 77 IND. L.J. 825 (2002) (analyzing the choice of law problem
among the potential latent injuries from 9/11).
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In structuring a fund for latent injuries, the obvious models are
the existing Victim Compensation Fund and the Agent Orange Set117
118
Also designed by Special Master Feinberg, the
tlement Fund.
Agent Orange Settlement Fund is an appropriate model of an administrative compensation scheme for latent injuries. Drawing from the
Agent Orange Settlement Fund and the Victim Compensation Fund,
one might loosely sketch a fund that will meet the changing needs of
the exposure-only victims of 9/11.
1. Financing, Administration, and
Claims Processing
Like the Victim Compensation Fund, the Latent Injury Fund
119
should be funded without limitation by Congress, and it should not
have a scheduled termination date. Because the Agent Orange Fund
was a finite program, individuals manifesting injuries after the fund
closed were precluded from recovering from the fund and filed suit
120
That litigation continues to be unagainst the original tortfeasors.
121
resolved.
The Latent Injury Fund must be inclusive of all who are
eligible and must be structured to maximize its accessibility to eligible
individuals.
Other than the medical research conducted independent of the
fund, the administration of the Latent Injury Fund should be consolidated within the Department of Justice. Like the Victim Compensation Fund, the decisions of the Latent Injury Fund should not be subject to judicial oversight and parties should be required to relinquish
their rights to litigate prior to opting into the fund. Without this quid
pro quo, Congress has no incentive to implement a new fund.

117

See generally In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff’d in part, 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987).
118
Id. at 1400.
119
See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. 107-42, §
404(b), 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001) (“There are authorized to be appropriated such sums
as may be necessary to pay the administrative and support costs for the Special Master
in carrying out this title.”); Id. § 406(b), 115 Stat. 230, 240 (“This title constitutes
budget authority in advance of appropriations Acts and represents the obligation of
the Federal Government to provide for the payment of amounts for compensation under this title.”).
120
Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
121
See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 346 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2003) (vacating and
remanding the case to the district court).
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2. Eligibility
a. Pre-Registration for the Latent Injury Fund
The question of eligibility is the most difficult one because of the
opportunity for fraud. However, the risk of fraud is an inadequate
reason to not create an assistance program. Additionally, fraudulent
122
applications to the Victim Compensation Fund were negligible. The
sooner the Latent Injury Fund is implemented, the sooner work can
begin to identify fraudulent cases. Registration for the WTC Health
Registry should be the first step in claiming eligibility. This has two
purposes: first, maximizing registration will expand the ability of the
medical community to collect information about the effects of exposure to the 9/11 plume; second, registration has no immediate benefit. Although there will undoubtedly be forward-looking fraud, no
benefits accrue at the time of registration and therefore there is less
incentive to register fraudulently. The Latent Injury Fund should rely
on the same fraud prevention guidelines as the Victim Compensation
123
Fund.
To avoid the Amchem problems of notice and concerns about imposing a requirement of action on the part of otherwise healthy, ex124
posure-only injuries, individuals should be permitted to opt into the
Latent Injury Fund despite not pre-registering. However, there
should be an increased level of scrutiny for proof of exposure for
those that did not pre-register for the fund via the Registry.
b. Eligibility for Compensation from the Latent Injury Fund
To borrow from the eligibility requirements for the Agent Orange
Fund, to be eligible for the Latent Injury Fund, one should be required to meet the following requirements: (1) the claimant was ex125
posed to toxins on or near the WTC site on 9/11, (2) the claimant

122

FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 104, at 69 (“By any measure, the Fund proved remarkably free from fraud and other criminal activity.”).
123
See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.71
(2004) (establishing oversight procedures for fraud detection, prevention, and quality
control).
124
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (“[T]hose without
current afflictions may not have the information or foresight needed to decide, intelligently, whether to stay in or opt out.”).
125
The period of time after 9/11 in which harmful exposure may have occurred
will be determined pursuant to the findings of the WTC Registry.
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suffers from a long-term total disability or has died, and (3) the
death or disability arose principally from causes attributable to 9/11
127
Like the Victim Compensation Fund, the Latent Injury
exposure.
Fund should not compensate claims for emotional distress without injury. Comprehensive medical studies through the Registry will need
to provide guidelines about what sort of injuries are likely attributable
to the exposure. These guidelines will require some initial flexibility
regarding eligible injuries. Like Agent Orange, exposure consultants
will need an objective methodology for evaluating the exposure of
128
claimants.
3. Award Determination
I will not comment on whether the much-debated features of the
Victim Compensation Fund should be replicated in any proposed
fund for latent injuries. The value of these features (collateral off-sets,
uniform awards for emotional harm, flexible awards for economic
129
harm) has been much discussed in the legal community and public
130
Although the individually tailored awards “mirror[ed] the
forums.
131
civil justice system,” the Special Master’s Final Report seems to advo132
cate a uniform award for all claimants.
While the administrative

126

Like the Agent Orange Fund, the Latent Fund should appropriate the Social
Security Act’s definitions of disability and death. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
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ease of a uniform award may trump all other considerations, it is important to remember that granting a uniform award does not track
the civil justice system, which is an important aspect of the Fund. Although a catastrophe of this magnitude heavily burdens our litigation
system, the parallels between the Fund and a civil suit recognize the
benefits of the justice system. As noted in the Final Report, a flat
award may not be sufficient consideration to force applicants to relin133
quish those benefits.
CONCLUSION
The American judicial system is ill-equipped to resolve mass toxic
torts. And the toxic plume released by the collapse of the World
Trade Center created a situation as unmanageable as any casebook
mass tort, but with a twist. The government simultaneously excluded
the potential 300,000 exposure-only victims from the Victim Compensation Fund and precluded those same victims from ever recovering
through the tort system.
The limited liability provision of the ATSSSA is unconstitutional.
Congress cannot protect the airline industry at the expense of the industry’s victims. If Congress wishes to maintain the liability cap in Title IV, it must provide an alternative compensation scheme to those
injured on 9/11. Whether the compensation scheme bears any resemblance to that set out here is of no consequence. We must protect
these victims at any cost.
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it”).

See id. at 83 (arguing that the “flat award” approach “has much to recommend

